The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Beijing developed in a climate of high regional expectations.
What has long been seen as a large rhetorical platform for Euroasiatic cooperation is being constantly remodeled by Beijing and Moscow in something more development oriented.
At the meeting, China’s leadership announced measures to establish an SCO Development Bank and promised a new credit line and soft loans spread over the next three years.
The amount may not be impressive in global financial terms, but for member states that face economic anguish, including Pakistan, the message was unmistakable: this forum will not only discuss security and multipolarity, but will also begin to channel funds and investments in tangible projects.
For Islamabad, that promise comes at a time when the breathing space is scarce, and every dollar counts.
The summit was also notable for the tone contrast between the directions of the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Shehbaz Sharif.
Modi, appearing in China for the first time since the violent border confrontation in Ladakh in 2020, stood closely with the themes that India has constantly raised in such meetings. He spoke of terrorism as a universal threat, making it clear that states that support violent networks would eventually face consequences.
He also repeated the reserves of India on the cross-border infrastructure corridors that do not respect sovereignty, a veiled reference to the Belt and Road initiative and specifically the alignment of CPEC through Gilgit-Baltistan.
Modi used the occasion to highlight that the preferred regional connectivity model of India is found in companies such as the Portes Chabahar project and the International North Transport Corridor, which, in Delhi’s opinion, generates confidence instead of violating the played edges.
Shehbaz Sharif, on the other hand, echoed the language that Beijing has focused on the SCO: respect for territorial integrity, mutual development and inclusive cooperation.
By carefully frame Pakistan’s position around sovereignty and at the same time rely on the promise of deeper industrial, technological and agricultural cooperation, his speech was aimed at neutralizing the recurring criticism of India and rethinking Pakistan as an indispensable partner in the new economic chapter of the block.
Beyond the plenary, Sharif’s commitments in Tianjin and bilateral meetings reinforced the message that Islamabad wants to convert the second phase of CPEC into a story not only of roads and electric power plants, but also of skills, factories and innovation.
It was a script designed to broadcast Pakistan not as a supplicant but as a participant arranged in the evolution of the SCO. Both leaders, in their own way, recognized the same reality: the SCO is moving away from its early identity as a security platform and becoming a forum where development, connectivity and financial support occupy the center of the stage.
But they diverged sharply in what this should mean. India considers that the initiative is risky if you legitimizes projects that invade a territory in dispute, and insists that security threats such as terrorism must continue to be the central concern of the group.
Pakistan, on the contrary, sees the new financing and emphasis based on projects as an opportunity to relieve their tax burdens, expand CPEC to sectors that generate exports and jobs, and gain legitimacy as a key state state.
For Islamabad, the week offered a rare convergence of opportunity. With Chinese support, the loan mechanisms proposed by the OCS could allow Pakistan to access alternatives beyond its exhausting IMF negotiation cycle.
Even relatively small credit lines, if combined with better governance, could promote special promised economic areas of long data or finance modernization in agriculture. The real challenge is not found in the ads but in delivery. To ensure that the acquisition is transparent, the projects are not politicized and the infrastructure actually produces productivity profits instead of white elephants.
The Sharif government now faces the difficult task of matching external promises with internal reform.
India’s approach, in turn, was cautious but uncompromising. By reaffirming its well -known position that connectivity cannot be imposed without consent and by prioritizing terrorism, Modi said that the Delhi record remained intact.
However, the OCS consensus culture and its orientation directed by China mean that the most acute concerns of India are often diluted in the final communications. Delhi risked to appear as a participant whose voice is registered but not amplified. His response has been to defend his own runners, Chabahar and Instc, but the credibility of these projects depends on load flows and schedules, not only the speeches of the summit.
The International North-South Transport Corridor (Instc) is a multimodal commercial route (which combines sea, rail and road) designed to connect India, Iran, Russia, Central Asia and Europe in a shorter, faster and more profitable way than traditional maritime routes.
It was first conceived in 2000 through an agreement between India, Iran and Russia, and then expanded to include more than a dozen Member States, including Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan and others.
Unless India can demonstrate that its favorite routes can offer faster and more cheaper access to Central Asia, the risk is that the economic turn of the SCO leaves Delhi more marginal than central. The policy around the summit was, as usual, fed by optics. Leaders clips that joined together, exchanging brief greetings or attending ceremonial events caught disproportionate attention.
Some Indian points of sale celebrated Modi images in conversation with XI and Putin. Some Pakistani channels emphasized the presence of Sharif along with the Chinese president in commemorative events.
But the deepest story lies in the speeches and financial announcements of the president. China reinforced its role as the main architect of the new phase of the SCO, while Pakistan positioned himself as a beneficiary and partner in that design.
India maintained his principles reserves, ensuring that he could not be accused of disconnection. What could, then, every country to win or lose this change? For Pakistan, the potential gain is double: new financial commitments that diversify their external options and diplomatic coverage in a block that amplifies its association with China.
The symbolism of being chosen as a central one for SCO connectivity is valuable at a time when domestic pressures increase. For India, risk is not immediate isolation but the gradual erosion of influence.
His insistence on sovereignty resonates at home and among some external partners, but within a forum where Beijing establishes the tempo, Moscow provides support and the states of Central Asia are anxious for investment, the objections of India may seem background noise unless they coincide with viable alternatives.
Ultimately, the SCO in Beijing stressed that the two rivals in southern Asia are playing different games at the same stage. Pakistan seeks capital, legitimacy and association through CPEC 2.0, while India insists on the beginning, sovereignty and precaution in security. Meanwhile, China says that both arguments must be carried out in a sand that dominates more and more.
The result of this contest will not be decided only with the speeches of the summit. For Pakistan, success depends on whether external promises translate into industrial areas in operation, better managed energy systems and skills development. For India, it is based on whether its alternative runners move from the plan to the commercial arteries in operation.
The lesson for Pakistan is to welcome the new finances, but remain attentive to the conditions, even when they are not explained as explicitly as those of the IMF programs.
Only when external support is linked to internal reform has seen sustainable growth. The lesson for India is that repeating its red lines is insufficient; You must try through real infrastructure and trade that your connectivity model is more viable than Beijing.
Both will have to do more to talk if they are going to convert the presence of the summit into a lasting advantage. The SCO cannot rival BRICS or replace Western financial institutions, but has overcome its reputation as a mere photo-operation. It is becoming a forum where resources, politics and strategy cross enough to shape the results.
Pakistan left Beijing with promises of money and the aura of the association. India stays with a repetition of principles that protect its red lines but do not shape the trajectory of the block.
In the changing geometry of Eurasia, a neighbor seems to have gained some space to maneuver, the other is a reminder of its limitations. However, both still determine their altitude through the work they do at home.
Discharge of responsibility: The views expressed in this piece are that of writer and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of PakGazette.TV.
The writer has a doctorate from the University of Birmingham, the United Kingdom. PUBLIC @NAAZIRMAHMOOD and can be contacted in:[email protected]
Originally published in the news
