The Court recalls that SC has previously stated that any disadvantage arising from being a proclaimed infringer
ISLAMABAD:
The Supreme Court has ruled that being declared a fugitive or absconder in a criminal case does not, by itself, preclude a person from pursuing civil or service-connected remedies.
In a five-page judgment written by Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, the top court held that continuation of criminal liability or status as a declared offender, “however serious, does not entail loss of these indispensable civil rights unless the legislature has expressly imposed such disability.”
Justice Shah warned that including such a ban in the law would “undermine the integrity of the justice system and, in fact, work as a double-edged sword.”
“An advantage to deprive a citizen of the right of appeal or legal recourse in matters affecting his livelihood, tenure of service, pensions, contractual obligations or financial responsibilities amounts to a denial of access to justice, a fundamental constitutional guarantee woven into Articles 4, 9, 10-A and 25.”
The decision came while answering whether a person’s fugitive status automatically prevents him from invoking civil or service jurisdiction. A division bench headed by Justice Shah and comprising Justice Aqeel Ahmad Abbasi heard the matter.
The ruling warned that such an exclusion “would not only subvert the principle that no one shall be treated except in accordance with the law, but would also distort the court’s function from an instrument of justice to a mechanism of oppression.”
It added that banning civil remedies on this basis “would erode the very safeguards that protect citizens against arbitrary actions, weaken public confidence in judicial institutions, and compromise the constitutional promise that justice will be administered fairly, transparently, and without discrimination.”
The court also highlighted how others could use the doctrine as a weapon. “The second advantage would invite deliberate exploitation by cunning and unscrupulous litigants.”
He warned that such people could weaponize a separate criminal label as a tactical device to thwart judicial review, insulate their conduct from scrutiny and avoid liability for contested actions.
“The practical effect would be to give opportunistic litigants a license to oppress; by invoking disenfranchisement, they could extinguish an aggrieved person’s access to resources that affect their livelihood, services, property, or contractual rights, and thereby deny them the procedural protections of notice, hearing, and appeal.”
Such misuse, the ruling noted, would turn the doctrine into “a cloak for bad faith litigation tactics that subvert the rule of law and deprive citizens of constitutionally guaranteed due process.”
Justice Shah further held that “criminal liability carries its own evidentiary thresholds and procedural safeguards, which are not applicable or determinative in matters of service.”
It noted that dismissing the petitioners based solely on their alleged absconding is therefore a clear misapplication of the law, as it conflates two distinct jurisdictions and deprives the petitioners of adjudication on issues directly within their civil and service rights.
The court recalled that the Supreme Court had previously stated that any disadvantage arising from being declared an offender “normally relates only to the case itself in which the proclamation is issued and does not extend to other matters that have no connection with that procedure.”
Therefore, “a declared offender is not, simply by virtue of that status, precluded from bringing or defending a civil suit or filing an appeal concerning his civil rights and obligations.”
The ruling added that unless a specific statute explicitly imposes such a disability, “disqualification cannot be construed implicitly in the service’s jurisprudence.”
Justice Shah traced the origins of the rule preventing fugitives from invoking appellate criminal jurisdiction to the “Fugitive Disenfranchisement Doctrine developed in the United States,” which evolved as an equitable rule in criminal procedure.
He noted that in the UK, similar consequences arise from “procedural rules and practical necessity”, where a non-surrendered appellant’s appeal may be dismissed.
Pakistan’s own jurisprudence has followed the “same procedural course”, requiring fugitives to surrender before their criminal appeals are heard.
However, the court stressed that this logic does not apply to civil or service matters. Within Pakistan’s constitutional framework – based on Articles 4, 9, 10A and 25 – “the right of access to justice cannot be restricted simply because a person is accused or has absconded in another area of law.”
Therefore, “unless a law expressly provides otherwise or unless fugitivity demonstrably hinders adjudication, absconding in a criminal matter cannot extinguish or suspend independent civil or service rights.”
