Experts say this is not the first time the country has found itself at the center of a geopolitical advance.
KARACHI:
After nearly six weeks of conflict between the United States, Israel and Iran, Islamabad negotiated a two-week ceasefire, maintaining a careful balancing act throughout, avoiding siding with either side while quietly working to open channels for de-escalation.
Less than two hours before the deadline set by US President Donald Trump for Tehran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz (who warned that “an entire civilization will die tonight and never be recovered”), Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced that both sides had agreed to an immediate ceasefire.
The praise that followed was swift and global, with world leaders lining up to congratulate Pakistan.
However, for those who have followed Pakistan’s diplomatic history closely, this is not the first time that Pakistan has found itself at the center of a geopolitical breakthrough, and that pattern is worth examining, as much as the ceasefire itself.
The country has a quiet but consequential history of becoming indispensable at times when the world’s great powers cannot, or will not, speak directly to each other.
An example of this occurred in 1971, when Washington and Beijing had not spoken in more than two decades.
The first signals were transmitted through Islamabad: Pakistan’s backchannels to China gave then-US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger a secret route to Beijing. His covert flight, routed through Islamabad, made possible Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972.
This led to Nixon’s famous handshake with Mao Zedong and a broader détente between the two countries, accompanied by the United States’ recognition of Communist China.
Pakistan had not only facilitated a meeting, it had helped reconfigure the global order.
According to Ambassador Masood Khalid, “In 1971, Pakistan played a pivotal role in bringing about a rapprochement between the United States and China, and that changed world politics.” “Chinese leaders even today recognize our contribution. American leaders like Dr. Kissinger also recognized our role,” he added.
Major General (retd) Inam ul Haque went further: “Pakistan was instrumental in the reconciliation between China and the United States in the 1970s. As far as our balancing act between China and the United States is concerned, our foreign office and our establishment are very experienced in doing so. We have been walking this narrow diplomatic path for a long time and we have been doing it very successfully.”
A decade and a half after contributing to the rapprochement between the United States and China, Pakistan was once again at the center of the story. The 1988 Geneva Accords, which ended the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, were made possible in large part by Pakistan’s role as a key conduit for the Afghan mujahideen and a key interlocutor between Washington and Afghan factions.
The agreements, a bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, included the United States and the Soviet Union as guarantors. It established the terms and schedule for the return of refugees and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.
Although the Afghan unrest continued after the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan, through strategic maneuvering of its diplomatic relations, managed to unite the United States and the Soviet Union during the tense period of the Cold War, and both powers remained guarantors of non-interference and non-intervention.
The cost Pakistan paid for that role was concrete and lasting.
Pakistan’s economy had to feed millions of Afghan refugees for nearly a decade as the country absorbed the narcotics trade and arms factionalism that the war had sown on its western border, consequences that would define Pakistani society for a generation.
Then came Doha in 2020, when Pakistan again quietly played a decisive role in bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table, facilitating the agreement that was celebrated internationally as a historic diplomatic achievement.
In the Doha Accords, also known as the Agreement to Bring Peace to Afghanistan, Pakistan leveraged its relationship with Washington and its influence with Taliban leaders to help end the long-running war.
The agreement established combat restrictions for both sides, as well as the withdrawal of all NATO forces from Afghanistan in exchange for counterterrorism commitments from the Taliban.
“Be it the Geneva Accords or the Doha Accords, Pakistan has demonstrated its commitment to peace and its ability to deliver on it,” Ambassador Khalid said.
Pakistan’s former permanent representative to the United Nations, Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, in a 2021 interview, also credited Islamabad for its role in the negotiation process.
He stated that Pakistan kept the channel of communication open with the Taliban, adding: “If we had not done so, Pakistan would not have been able to play the constructive role it played in assisting the sequence of events that led to the Doha agreement between the United States and the Taliban.”
However, the commitments of the agreements were not fulfilled. Part of the Doha pact was a guarantee that Afghanistan would not allow any terrorist group to use its soil to attack a foreign country; However, in the following years, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan grew stronger, not weaker, operating from Afghan territory with training camps in Kunar, Nangarhar and Khost. Pakistan had helped negotiate a deal whose consequences fell squarely on itself.
The dividend question
Three moments, three generations, a surprisingly consistent pattern and a question that refuses to go away: what has Pakistan really taken away? The Geneva Accords left Pakistan in charge of millions of Afghan refugees and a narco-weapons economy that would haunt it for decades.
Doha produced neither security nor economic reward, only an emboldened Taliban on its border and a deepening insurgency at home. In 2025, Pakistan was experiencing six times more terrorist incidents than in 2020, the year the Doha Accords were signed.
Nixon’s opening to China also reshaped the world, but Pakistan remained aloof from what followed.
According to Khalid, “whether Pakistan reaped strategic dividends or not is debatable.” “I don’t think it can be measured in net losses or gains, it depended on the situation and the geopolitical dynamics of the moment,” he said.
