The ink had barely dried on the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) when it ran into difficulties: a painful reminder that peace between the two sides is inherently fragile, always one step away from falling apart, and that the Strait is likely to remain a flashpoint for a long-term détente between Washington and Tehran.
Shortly after the US attacks on Iran, President Donald Trump said in a social media post that it was “very possible” that Tehran would “never learn.”
The Islamabad MoU is an interim agreement on the basis of which Iran and the United States will negotiate and conclude a final treaty within 60 days (the deadline is extendable), which will be supported by a binding resolution of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
From Tehran’s point of view, the most important provision of the MoU is that the United States will end “all types” of sanctions against Iran. The language here is categorical, without qualifications. Until sanctions are lifted, Washington will grant exemptions for the export of Iranian crude oil and petrochemicals. The United States will also release frozen and restricted Iranian funds and, in collaboration with regional partners (Gulf states), launch a $300 billion plan for Iran’s economic reconstruction.
In exchange, Iran “will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons.” The language here is equally categorical. Enriched uranium stored in Iran will be disposed of in a manner agreed upon by the two countries as part of the final deal. Until then, Iran will maintain the current status of its nuclear program and the United States will not impose any new sanctions on Iran; nor will it deploy additional forces to the region.
The MoU prohibits the use, or threat of use, of force by the two parties against each other, and commits them to guaranteeing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon, which in recent years has borne the brunt of Israel’s firepower. The United States will end the naval blockade of Iran in 30 days, while Iran will use “best efforts” to lift the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and allow free passage of commercial cargo for 60 days. The future administration of the strait will be defined through dialogue between Iran and Oman, in accordance with applicable international law.
It follows that the main commitment made by Iran in the MoU is not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons in exchange for the lifting of all sanctions by Washington, which over the years has paralyzed the Iranian economy and squeezed citizens. The lifting of sanctions will allow Iran to reintegrate into the international economy and trade and will help eliminate the most critical reason for the people’s discontent with the Iranian establishment.
Therefore, the MoU – should it lead to a final agreement – will be immensely beneficial to both the government and people of Iran. A definitive treaty between the United States and Iran will also provide much-needed assurances to Iran’s neighbors in the Gulf.
President Donald Trump is being criticized for conceding “too much” to Iran, particularly for pledging to end all sanctions against Iran and promising to launch a multibillion-dollar program for the country’s economic reconstruction. That said, critics should note that Iran’s engagement on the nuclear issue has satisfied Washington’s long-standing demand.
Although Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), under which only those states have the right to maintain nuclear weapons that have manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device before January 1, 1967, the Americans never trusted Tehran to honor its commitment to the NPT. US sanctions on Iran were designed primarily to prevent it from becoming a nuclear power.
Should Tehran keep its word on the nuclear issue, there is no reason for Washington to continue with sanctions.
Not only that, but the revival of Iran’s economy and its reintegration into international economic and trade regimes will open avenues for the United States in terms of both trade and investment. As the second-largest country in the Middle East after Egypt, Iran is a potentially large market for American products.
In particular, Iran’s civil aviation industry, hit by sanctions and hurt by its aging aircraft, presents an attractive prospect for US-based Boeing. I have spent a few years in Tehran and am familiar with the high preference among Iran’s urban population for Western goods and services.
How does Islamabad’s MoU compare to the JCPOA (better known as the Iran nuclear deal) signed by the Obama administration in 2015? In addition to the JCPOA being a final, plurilateral agreement signed by the five de jure nuclear states and the European Union with Iran, the two agreements differ in several substantive provisions.
Under the JCPOA, Iran committed to limit its nuclear program under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in such a way that it would not lead to the production of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium.
However, Tehran did not expressly commit to not producing or acquiring nuclear weapons. It was primarily for this reason that Trump abandoned the JCPOA in his first term.
The other JCPOA signatories gave Iran relief from some, but not all, sanctions. Furthermore, the lifting of sanctions was contingent on IAEA reports confirming that Iran was fulfilling its side of the deal. The United States suspended its secondary sanctions on Iran, but the primary sanctions remained intact.
Secondary sanctions prevented any third country from doing business with Iran’s sanctioned institutions or companies (such as the central bank and Revolutionary Guard), while primary sanctions prevented US citizens and US-based companies and institutions from doing business with sanctioned Iranian entities. Since most international transactions use the US dollar, despite the lifting of secondary sanctions, only a few countries were able to resume normal trade relations with Iran.
The notable difference in substance between the two agreements is mainly due to different contexts. The JCPOA was the fruit of extensive negotiations carried out in a peaceful environment. Its text was complete and its sequential implementation was supposed to extend over several years. On the contrary, the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding was born out of a serious crisis: the war between the United States and Iran, which had sent international energy trade into a tailspin. To close the war, it was necessary for both sides to make broad commitments immediately through a provisional agreement.
The smooth implementation of the MoU leading to a final agreement will remain susceptible to several spoilers. Trump’s occasional rants are just one of them, and possibly the least important. At the top of these potential spoilers is the reaction of Israel and its strong lobby in Washington, which wants nothing less than total impoverishment leading to the annihilation of Iran.
Should Israel fail to respect Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity or its powerful supporters in Washington convince the Trump administration to maintain sanctions on Iran, the planned treaty could fall apart after some time. As the resumption of hostilities between the United States and Iran picks up, the management of the Strait of Hormuz will remain another sticking point.
The writer is an Islamabad-based columnist. He tweets/posts @hussainhzaidi and can be contacted at: [email protected]
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of PakGazette.tv.
Originally published in The News
