Argues that the maintainability of the appeal corresponds exclusively to the SC, it cannot be exercised by the registrar
ISLAMABAD:
Former Prime Minister Imran Khan and his wife Bushra Bibi on Monday challenged in the Supreme Court the secretary’s decision to return their petitions against the Islamabad High Court’s refusal to stay their judgments in the £190 million Al-Qadir Trust case.
The couple filed an appeal before the chamber through their lawyer, advocate Salman Safdar, under Order V, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2025, challenging the registrar’s June 29 decision to remand their petitions against the April 30 order of the IHC.
The chamber’s appeal argued that the recorder’s office primarily has administrative and procedural powers related to the filing and processing of cases.
“Such powers are limited to ensuring compliance with procedural requirements, including scrutiny of form, limitation and other prescribed defects, and do not extend to the resolution of substantive or justiciable issues,” the appellate chamber argued, adding that the determination of maintainability, particularly when it involved the interpretation of constitutional or statutory provisions, was a judicial function requiring the application of legal reasoning and consideration of rival submissions.
This jurisdiction “lies exclusively with the Supreme Court and cannot be exercised by the registrar on an administrative basis,” he stated.
The appeal further held that while returning the petitions, the registrar’s office had not considered the crucial aspect that under Article 175-A of the Constitution, any judgment, decree, final order and ruling of the high court could be appealed to the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) when expressly provided for by law.
He argued that Section 32A of the National Accountability Ordinance (NAO) provides for a second appeal to the FCC against a high court decision under Section 32 of the ordinance following the rejection of a first appeal.
“However, the NAO does not expressly provide for an appeal against an order made on an application for suspension of a sentence, even where such application arises in an appeal under section 32 of the Ordinance,” the chamber’s appeal said.
