Islamabad:
An official investigation has not set the responsibility of an “astronomical increase” of 240% in the cost of the DASU hydroelectric project to $ 6.2 billion in any entity or individual, but pointed, in Chinese contractors, WAPDA and the Planning Commission.
The three -members committee also blamed the local administration of the Kohistan district for a delay in land acquisition. He said the cost increased by RS48 billion due to the best security agreements after two mortal attacks against Chinese contractors. The impact of the security agreement was only 3.8% on the total cost escalation.
The report declared that the “complex interaction of unforeseen factors and challenges” caused the delay to 10 years and the increase of RS1.3 billion or 240% in the cost of the Hydropower Dasu project to RS1.74 billion. In terms of dollars, the cost was equal to $ 6.2 billion, an unreasonable price for a hydroelectric project of 2,160 megawatts.
The committee said that the Chinese contractor ignored the instructions of the consultants, the local administration could not acquire the land in time and, more importantly, Wapda granted the construction contracts “without guaranteeing the availability of the land required by the contractors, which resulted in delays and inactive claims.”
The committee could not fix the responsibility in any of the presidents of WAPDA or any superior officer by name despite finding that he granted contracts without having land in hand.
The Planning Commission has been responsible for underestimating land acquisition and resettlement problems.
Directed by Planning Minister Ahsan IQBAL, the Central Development Labor Party on Friday, on Friday, the Hydropower Dasu project for the approval of the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council.
“It is an opinion considered that delays in the Hydropower Dasu (stage-1) project are the result of a complex interaction of factors,” reads the findings of the three-member committee.
In December, the Government ordered the investigation to identify the reasons and fix responsibility for the inability to complete the project after the first review carried out in the cost in 2019.
The Research Committee was directed by the civil engineer Ather Hameed. Among the other members was Syed Ayaz Muhammad Haider, director of monitoring of the Ministry of Water Resources and an expert in Procurement of Imran Najam of the Ministry.
The investigation concluded that the delays in the construction have been aggravated by important administrative challenges and the procedure bottlenecks in land acquisition, compensation payment and resettlement processes. “
Unforeseen technical challenges have further distracted the project implementation program. According to the committee, social problems, including complaints and community resistance, have further slowed down progress.
The Research Committee also declared that the lack of perfect coordination between contractors and consultants, security challenges in the project area and natural causes, such as difficult land, unforeseen geological conditions and sudden floods have been added to delays.
“These problems are interconnected, which makes it clear that the only interested party or responsible entity cannot be responsible,” the investigation committee concluded.
When it was contacted, the secretary of the Ministry of Water Resources, Syed Ali Murtaza, said that the investigation was conducted by the engineering advisor, which is an independent entity and is destined to make such consultations.
The secretary also said that the investigation committee discovered that the 85% increase in cost was due to the increase in prices and that the remaining 15% was due to changes in the scope and design of the project.
The Investigation Committee declared that the success of the project depends on a collaborative approach that fosters alignment and cooperation between the federal government, the provincial government of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, administration of the district of Kohistan, Wapda, contractors, consultants and local communities.
The consultation recommended improving the coordination of interested parties, simplifying compensation and resettlement processes. He also proposed to proactively address social problems, particularly in the 132 kV transmission line and implement a solid management strategy to manage technical, social and security challenges.
But these are the problems that should have been addressed in 2014. The project has already been delayed in 10 years to 2029.
The original PC-I that cost RS486 billion had been approved in 2014 with the aim of generating 2,160mw of electricity and the completion date was 2019. Due to the increase in the earth rate, the cost was reviewed at RS511 billion in October 2019 and the implementation extended to June 2024.
The main civil work contractor for stage I is M/S China Gezhouba Group Company (CGGC), while the supervision is provided by a joint company of M/S Nippon Koei of Japan and m/s dolly of Turkey in association with local sub -consultants that include m/s dmc, m/s ndc and m/s pees, according to the report of the investigation of January 2025.
As of January, general physical progress is 23.3% and financial progress at 23%, establishes the research report on the second review. The project is mainly financed by the World Bank Banks, local and foreigners and through Wapda Equity. Until now, RS317 billion have been spent on the project.
The total cost of RS1,73 billion included RS479 billion interests on loans that will be taken to complete the project.
The World Bank had given $ 517 million and of which until December $ 385 million were used. The Credit Suisse Bank also provided a loan of $ 350 million. The local bank consortium led by M/S Habib Bank Limited also provided a loan of RS144 billion against the original cost of the project.
The World Bank is also ready to see another expensive loan of $ 1 billion for the project.
Rupture of Cost Escalation
The consultation report has listed a comparison of the highest cost of RS511 billion at RS1,73 billion. The cost of civil works increased from RS224.5 billion to RS771 billion, an increase of RS547 billion or 243%. The cost of electrical and mechanical working increased from RS54.3 billion to RS87.3 billion, an increase of RS33 billion or 61%.
The cost of social resettlement increased from RS57.5 billion to RS140.3 billion, an increase of RS82 billion or 144%.
The security cost increased from RS1.5 billion to RS50 billion, an increase of RS48.2 billion or 3136%. The project has faced two suicidal attacks that result in murders of 15 Chinese nationals and four Pakistani.
The cost of project administration increased from RS13.5 billion tors54.4 billion, an increase of RS41 billion or 304%. The cost of consulting increased from RS8.3 billion to RS56.5 billion, an increase of R48.2 billion or 580%. From the amount of loans jumped, so does the cost of interest. The cost of interest increased from RS107 billion to RS479 billion, an increase of RS372 billion or 349%.
The contingencies increased from RS44 billion to RS99 billion, an increase of RS55 billion or 124%.
The Investigation Committee said there was a significant delay in the acquisition of land of 9,875 acres. But the impact on the cost of the land had already been included in the first reviewed project, and it is not the reason for the cost climbing in the second review.
The committee said that the relocation of the 52 -kilometer long Karakoram road experienced significant changes due to delays in the acquisition of land and geological conditions. However, the Committee did not solve the responsibility of ignoring geological conditions at the time of planning first in 2014 and then in 2019 when the project was reviewed.
The committee validly identified security as a reason for delay, but increased the cost only by RS48 billion of the total additional increase in the cost of RS1.27 billion.
Fixing responsibility
The Research Committee identified the lack of coordination between the contractor and the engineer. He said that delays occurred due to “the contractor’s failure to present activity plans, frequent contempt for the consultant’s instructions, the insufficient deployment of resources despite the repeated directives and the inappropriate coordination between the contractor and the engineer.”
In addition, he said that the contractor’s reports indicated that the resources currently available in each workplace are inadequate to achieve the dates of termination of the objective.
The committee said the district administration was responsible for acquiring the land, which could not acquire on time. The committee said the WAPDA awarded the contracts without guaranteeing the availability of the land required by the contractors, which resulted in inactive delays and claims.
The slow rhythm of the local area development program eroded community confidence and exacerbated local resistance, which reflects a period of Wapda’s responsibility for an effective community agreement.
“Both WAPDA and the Planning Commission not only clearly underestimated the acquisition and resettlement of the Earth, but also showed lack of cognitive approach to the planning and programming of projects without completing substantial the acquisition of land and the resettlement process.”
The Investigation Committee said that the Chinese contractor is also responsible for the slow progress in the construction of prey and power works due to the mobilization of inappropriate resources.
The Committee said that AD DASU Hydropower Consultants’s advertisers were responsible for “frequent design changes, which highlights deficiencies by the design consultant.
The absence of a dedicated PC-I approved for land acquisition as recommended by the Planning Commission, indicates policy supervision that has contributed to project delays.
