Pakistan is once again facing a sharp rise in militant violence, marking one of the most challenging internal security phases since the peak of terror incidents in 2010.
In the years since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, attacks have increased in frequency, coordination and lethality. However, the most worrying reality is not only the resurgence of militancy but the state’s continued dependence on a largely kinetic response to what are, in fact, two very different threats.
Pakistan today faces two different scenarios of violence, each driven by different motivations, actors and ultimate objectives. Treating them through a uniform security lens risks strategic stalemate.
The first theater focuses on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Pashtun belt of Balochistan, where militancy is ideologically driven in the name of religion. Groups such as the TTP and the Haqqani Network, supported by the Afghan Taliban and transnational actors such as Daesh and remnants of networks with links to Al-Qaeda, seek to appropriate a piece of land to establish a rigid and exclusive version of a Sunni theocratic state.
The return of the Afghan Taliban to power has altered the operating environment in their favor. Whether through direct support, tolerance or failure to act, the space available to anti-Pakistan militant groups across the border has expanded. The TTP has demonstrated renewed organizational coherence and operational capability, carrying out increasingly sophisticated attacks with weapons abandoned by the United States.
The second theater is in the majority Balochistan districts of Balochistan, where the conflict is not religious but political. Baloch insurgent groups frame their struggle around complaints of political marginalization, unequal distribution of resources, lack of provincial autonomy, and human rights concerns. Its objectives range from greater autonomy within the federation to outright separatism.
These are fundamentally different conflicts. One is ideological and transnational; the other is political and subnationalist. Yet Pakistan’s response to both remains overwhelmingly similar: intelligence-based military operations, increasingly supplemented lately by air power, including alleged cross-border strikes on militant sanctuaries.
There is no doubt that such operations have generated tactical benefits. However, tactical success has not translated into lasting stability. Militant violence temporarily declines, only to re-emerge in more adaptive forms. The problem is not the use of force per se; It is an excessive dependence on him.
A critical, yet often overlooked, dimension of this challenge is the weakening of Pakistan’s institutional coordination framework. The mandate to integrate and harmonize national counter-terrorism efforts formally rests with the National Counter-Terrorism Authority (Nacta). Effective coordination requires neutrality and the ability to align federal and provincial actors without institutional bias.
When coordinating bodies also participate at the operational level, questions of territory, ownership, and institutional primacy inevitably arise, particularly in relation to federal civilian agencies and provincial counterterrorism departments.
The result is a fragmented response architecture. Information may be shared, but policy coherence remains weak. Provincial counterterrorism departments, already operating under capacity constraints, lack a consistent national framework with which to align, while civilian oversight appears increasingly marginalized. For the moment, Pakistan risks continuing with reactive measures rather than a unified national strategy.
This institutional weakness is compounded by the ambiguity surrounding the policy framework itself. The revised National Action Plan (NAP), now carried out under the banner of Azm-e-Istehkam, is presented as the central roadmap for the fight against terrorism. However, closer examination reveals that it consists largely of broad, abstract objectives rather than a viable strategy. It does not clearly specify who is responsible for what, nor does it set time-bound goals or measurable benchmarks.
Without clearly assigned responsibilities and deadlines, even well-intentioned policy goals risk remaining aspirational. Indeed, Pakistan has a declared policy direction in the form of the National Policy on Prevention of Violent Extremism 2024, but lacks an implementation framework.
Instead, what is needed is a truly holistic national policy, one that places economic security at its center, recognizing that instability, unemployment and regional disparities create fertile ground for both ideological militancy and political insurgency. This must be complemented by integrated efforts in internal security, social development and foreign policy, particularly in managing relations with Afghanistan. Counterterrorism cannot succeed in isolation from these broader state functions.
In the case of religious militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan is engaged in both a war of ideas and a war of arms. Groups like the TTP and Islamic State Khorasan draw strength from narratives of religious legitimacy, anti-state rhetoric, and exploitation of governance gaps.
However, the state’s counternarrative remains weak and fragmented. It is mainly based on the Pyam e Pakistan fatwa, which declares that suicide bombings and the murder of innocent people are un-Islamic, but does not tell the youth that the concept of nation-states and the evolution of social sectors are in accordance with the mandates of Islam. The recent use of Fitna al Khawarij and Fitna al Hind labels seems to be a step in the right direction, but the neglected area of madrasa reforms still offers spaces for radicalization.
In Balochistan, the limitations of a kinetic-first approach are even more evident. Political grievances cannot be resolved through force alone. While security operations can suppress insurgent activity, they do little to address the underlying causes that sustain it. Development initiatives, often presented as solutions, struggle to gain legitimacy when local populations feel excluded from decision-making or perceive that benefits come from external factors.
The absence of meaningful political dialogue, transparent resource-sharing mechanisms and empowered local governance structures continues to widen the trust deficit. As history repeatedly shows, subnationalist insurgencies rarely end without political settlements.
Recent signs of a more assertive stance, including cross-border attacks on Afghanistan, reflect growing frustration within Pakistan’s security establishment. However, escalation without a parallel diplomatic and political strategy carries significant risks and regional tensions, civil consequences and further radicalization. More importantly, it does not address the core factors of militancy, ideology, governance deficits and political exclusion.
A coherent and holistic counterterrorism strategy is urgently needed, clearly distinguishing between the nature of threats and aligning responses accordingly. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, this means combining precise security operations with a robust ideological counter-offensive, better policing and better governance. In Balochistan, a shift is required from a security-based approach to a politically-led one based on dialogue, inclusion and justice.
At the national level, restoring the authority of Nacta, moving beyond the abstract formulations of the revised National Action Plan and translating Azm and Istehkam into an implementable, time-bound framework are no longer optional options but urgent necessities. The choice now is difficult: continue to manage violence through episodic force or address its causes through a coherent national strategy? Without such change, the state risks becoming trapped in a cycle in which tactical victories are repeatedly overtaken by strategic failure.
The author is former Inspector General of Police (Punjab) and former acting Home Minister of Punjab.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of PakGazette.tv.
Originally published in The News
