PUBLISHED November 16, 2025
ISLAMABAD:
After the collapse of the Istanbul dialogue and two terrorist attacks on its soil originating from Afghanistan, any likely decision by Pakistan to simultaneously exercise the options of blocking human and commercial movement across the border and flexing security muscles may aggravate Kabul’s problems and generate internal pressure on the regime to normalize ties.
According to trade statistics, Afghanistan’s exports to Pakistan were equal to 45 percent of its total exports in 2024, making Islamabad the largest trading partner. Kabul’s heavy dependence on Islamabad and its status as a landlocked country mean that the western neighbor has limited alternatives to suddenly find a sustainable market for almost half of its exports.
From its southeast, south and east sides, Afghanistan uses three border points to sell its products to Pakistan. These are close to their agricultural products and make Pakistan an economically viable option to sell fresh fruits, vegetables and dry fruits.
According to Pakistan Customs, Kabul exported goods worth Rs 170 billion to Pakistan through these border crossings in fiscal year 2024-25. More than 70 per cent of the goods were sent through the Torkham border, followed by a fifth from Ghulam Khan and the rest through Kharlachi point.
After the closure of borders due to unrest and severe security situation, farmers in Afghanistan are suffering huge financial losses. Afghanistan’s exports of perishable goods, such as fresh fruits, vegetables and nuts, depend on short-distance, low-cost transportation to Pakistani markets. Diversion through other countries makes such exports less competitive due to longer transit and greater risks of perishable products spoiling. There is also a lack of cold storage facilities to transport perishable goods to long-distance seaports.
Realizing the situation and to avoid losses, Afghan exporters continue to make desperate attempts to reach Pakistani markets through alternative routes. On November 8, Pakistan Customs blocked the import of Afghan-origin products through Iran by misusing the Early Harvest Programme. An attempt was made to use the Taftan post from the Iranian side.
Pakistan Customs did not allow the consignment to enter Pakistan on the grounds that the early harvest program was intended to provide mutual benefits to farmers of both countries on a bilateral and reciprocal basis. However, there was no trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan as the borders remained closed.
Customs also denied entry of goods of Afghan origin on the grounds that there was a potential risk of misuse of the early harvest facility, as similar consignments can be imported from Iran under the guise of Afghan origin, given that both countries produce comparable fresh fruits, such as grapes and apples, which are also covered by the Early Harvest Programme.
If Pakistan does not open its borders and also restrict the movement of Afghan citizens, the interim government may not have many options in the short term. Alternative routes through Iran are Chabahar port and Hairatan-Termez, Torghundi-Serhetabat in Central Asia.
These corridors face high transportation costs, weak infrastructure, and complicated regional policies. Therefore, despite the tensions, Pakistan will remain the most viable and profitable trade corridor for Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.
The Afghan interim government this week expressed a desire to pursue alternative trade routes, but may not be able to provide those opportunities to its exporters in the short and medium term.
Iranian routes are longer and more expensive, resulting in higher transportation and fuel costs compared to Pakistani corridors. The Kandahar and Helmand regions are between 150 and 300 kilometers from the borders of Chaman and Spin Boldak in Pakistan, but between 1,200 and 1,300 kilometers from the borders of Zaranj or Delaram in Iran.
Likewise, Balkh and Baghlan are approximately 500 to 700 kilometers from the Torkham-Jalalabad borders in Pakistan and 900 to 1,000 kilometers from Islam Qala in Iran.
Alternative routes would substantially increase transportation costs, ranging from 30 to 50 percent. While Afghan farmers are facing problems, Pakistani transporters also have fewer opportunities to earn money due to border closures.
The growing number of Afghanistan-bound cargo stuck in Pakistan despite the closure of international borders after the skirmishes highlights landlocked Kabul’s dependence on Pakistan amid its desire to seek alternative routes.
According to Pakistan Customs, more than 5,500 containers bound for Afghanistan were stuck on roads or in the port of Karachi. Some 4,650 containers were stuck in sea and land ports after Pakistan Customs stopped their processing due to the closure of international borders.
Pakistan has not suspended the Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement but was not processing clearance of goods due to border closure to avoid congestion at the Chaman and Torkham borders. There were 729 containers stuck at the Chaman border and another 142 at the Torkham border.
Pakistan made many positive gestures on the fronts of trade, humanitarian assistance, facilitation of medical and educational visas, and efforts in international forums to encourage the international community to collaborate with the Taliban regime for the sake of regional peace and stability, and for the socio-economic development of Afghanistan and its people.
But the Taliban regime’s response has only been empty promises and inaction and the excuse that it cannot take action against the terrorist group. If the situation does not improve, Pakistan could also consider other economically punitive measures, including requiring bank guarantees against cargo in transit.
Pakistan has suffered immense military and civilian casualties, exercised maximum restraint and did not retaliate, according to Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
However, indicators now indicate that maximum moderation may no longer be an option.
Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry said the Taliban regime was constantly trying to misrepresent the issue of Pakistani terrorists hiding in Afghanistan as a humanitarian issue. In the wake of Pakistan’s Zarb-e-Azb operation in 2015, terrorists belonging to the so-called TTP/FaK fled to Afghanistan.
The recent terrorist attacks on the Islamabad Judicial Complex, which killed more than 12 innocent civilians, and an attack on a cadet college in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa could be the last straw in the camel’s back.
According to Pakistani authorities, Sajid ullah alias Shina, who was responsible for the suicide bomber, confessed that TTP Commander Saeed ur-Rahman alias Dadullah, a resident of Charmang, Bajaur, currently living in Afghanistan and serving as TTP Intelligence Chief for Nawagai of Bajaur, contacted him through Telegram application and ordered him to carry out a suicide attack in Islamabad to inflict maximum damage on the Pakistani forces. order.
Dadullah sent Sajid ullah (Shina) the photographs of the suicide bomber, Usman alias Qari, so that he could receive him in Pakistan. The suicide bomber, Usman (Qari), belonged to the Shinwari tribe and resided in Achin, Nangarhar, Afghanistan.
Traces of the attack on the Cadet College are also found in Afghanistan by security agencies.
Pakistan’s former ambassador to Kabul Mansoor Ahmad Khan argued on Express News show The Review that the government can use all three options – restricting the movement of people, trade and using security means to pressure the regime to take action against the terrorist group. But he stressed the need to try to reopen dialogue with Afghanistan.
