Posted on August 3, 2025
Karachi:
Narendra Modi could have thought that May would bring his best hour. After successively increasing the bet with Pakistan every time the militancy reviewed the Indians, the Jammu and Kashmir (Iiojk) illegally occupied, his regime had a ready -time book. Pakistan, scapegoat for his own failures in the territory in dispute, “taught a lesson.” So what would happen if the last time had knocked down an Indian plane or two? For their right -wing circumscription, the lessons had surely been learned, the ‘strategic costs’ were demanded. Pakistan, crowded with his own problems, political and economic, surely could not be kept up to date with the doctrine of the disproportionate response that the Modi government had cultivated so carefully.
And so, the military brass of India received Carta Blanca and the Sindoor operation was launched. In a matter of hours, however, or more minutes, it was clear that it would hang like an albatros around the Modi government’s neck.
This week, when the Parliament of India met again for its monsoon session, the government faced its calculation moment. Far from a return of the victory, the debate on the Sindoor operation was developed under a cloud of restlessness. Interior Minister Amit Shah doubled, telling legislators that the terrorists responsible for the attack of the Pahalgama on April 22, which caused the crisis, had been “neutralized” in a separate mission called Operation Mahadev. But the moment of the announcement, conspicuously aligned with the parliamentary session, raised his eyebrows. Was this a genuine update or political theater designed to resume the control of the narrative?
The opposition leader Rahul Gandhi, who has demonstrated greater comfort playing disruptive, was not buying it. He demanded transparency on the costs of the operation, questioning why, if the mission had really succeeded, India had to trust external mediation to stop hostilities.
Mediating the end of hostilities and saving southern Asia from the ‘nuclear catastrophe’ is something that the president of the United States, Donald Trump, has enjoyed taking credit at every visible opportunity in the weeks after the Sindoor operation. To the point that some might ask if some kind of child pleasure is deriving when rubbing the nose of the Modi regime in the fact that, despite the entire nationalist bravucón, it was Washington’s call, not Delhi’s directive, which attracted the curtain of this Brinkmanship act. Trump has surpassed in the consecutive press conferences, praised the “excellent cooperation” of Pakistan, and almost issued a score card of the average crisis where the Modi government came out as the imprudent actor who needs supervision.
That narrative has not gone unnoticed by the comment of India, many of whom begin to ask uncomfortable questions about the costs of the strategic adventurer in a multipolar world. This was how the third term of Modi would begin. The electoral domain of the BJP had promised continuity, certainty and a foreign policy without apologies. On the other hand, just two months in the new term, the headlines are saturated with words such as “climbing”, “de-scallation”, “Back-” channel and “moderation.” And although New Delhi insists that the Sindoor operation was a “necessary corrective” for the “intransigence” of Pakistan, the emerging consensus, even among the National Security elite of India, is that the operation failed to deliver anything close to a strategic restart.
More revealing is emerging speech in Indian opinion articles. BJP writers have revolved from triumphalism to tactical justification. However, the most independent are not blows. In The wireThe author and analyst Pushparaj undanded exposed the contradictions in the government account.
“Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated in Parliament that” the Indian Armed Forces received full freedom (operationally to attack Pakistan). “However, this statement was contradicted by an old aggregate defense that revealed that the Indian Air Force suffered avoidable losses due to political instructions that produced attacks on the military facilities of Pakistani and the air defense systems,” he wrote. Similarly, Ubpande pointed out, the statement of the Minister of Defense Rajnath Singh in the Rajya Sabha that “Pakistan could not cause any damage to the Indian side” was directly contradicted by the chief of defense (CDS) of India, who confirmed the loss of IAF IAF combat jets during clashes with Pakistan. “These collectively suggest a deliberate attempt by the BJP government of obfuscar the true costs of the operation, presumably to protect the strong man image of Prime Minister Modi,” he concluded.
An editorial in The Hindu touched a similar note: “The strident approach of the Narendra Modi government seeks to change [what India claims is] Pakistan’s behavior and reassuring his domestic audience … A demonstrated disposition to use force against Pakistan in case of a terrorism incident is a definitive turn in India’s strategy … but there is still no evidence that he is working, although the ruling party has been the chest around him … The success of this approach is debatible. “
The piece went further, questioning the conflicting statements of the government: “The government affirmed the success when fulfilling its objectives of launching a military operation and denied that it had acted under pressure by ending the war. Leader of the opposition in the Lok Sabha Rahul Gandhi demanded a pointed response to the repeated claims of the president of the United States, Donald, Donald, that he measured the cessation of cessation, a direct answer “.
The editorial did not give words in its closing evaluation: “The [Indian] The government contradicts itself when it says that the operation was a success, and that it continues … there was little self -reflection regarding the failures that led to the incident of terrorism and if the government plans to address them. “
Outside the borders of India and more and more within them, the perception at this time is this: India played a rapid and decisive action to reaffirm the regional domain and, on the other hand, he found himself returning to international supervision, explaining the counts of murders not verified and avoiding questions about the fall of his own planes. And they are not just editorial writers who raise the alarm. Retired military officers and policy analysts, many once aligned with the strategic assertiveness of Modi’s vision, now question long -term viability of what they call “performance deterrence”: the idea that visible and punitive strikes can replace a sustainable strategy.
This correction of the course seems to be taking place even when official channels try to project trust. The Ministry of External Affairs of India insists that the Sindoor operation sent an “unmistakable message”, and commentators aligned with BJP have tried to rethink the operation as a success precisely because it avoided a broader war. But it is unlikely that this hand game remains for a long time.
The unanswered question, why start a staircase doctrine if it must be abandoned in the middle of the diplomatic pressure, it is now echoed not only through Think Tanks and writings, but also among voters who expected their government to issue terms, not negotiate the cessation of cessation of cessas through foreign capitals.
The irony is bitter. Modi’s strongest claim to geopolitical weight had always been his ability to align the nationalist feeling with the calculation of Realpolitik. But this time, Washington and Beijing, both anxious to preserve regional stability, seemed more in control of the crisis calendar than Delhi. And Islamabad, far from being “taught a lesson,” arose with noted diplomatic points and international credibility strengthened by their moderation and preparation to participate.
It remains to be seen if the Modi government will learn from this episode. But one thing is already clear: the play book that took him to this moment may not take him much further. Not without taking into account the limits of the show and the growing costs of extralimitation.
