Says impeachment, not mandatory retirement, is justified when public trust is lost
Police officers walk past the Supreme Court of Pakistan building, in Islamabad, Pakistan, April 6, 2022. REUTERS
ISLAMABAD:
Emphasizing that public trust is the cornerstone of the judiciary, the Supreme Court has ruled that a judge whose reputation is poor cannot continue to hold judicial office, even if a specific act of corruption has not been conclusively proven.
The ruling came in an eight-page judgment written by Justice Shahid Waheed while reinstating a notice for the removal of a judicial officer from the service.
A three-member bench headed by Justice Waheed examined whether a judicial official deemed disreputable, although not proven guilty of a specific act of corruption, could be retained in service and whether mandatory retirement could serve as a legally sustainable alternative to dismissal.
Answering those questions in the negative, the court held that integrity occupies a central place in judicial service and that the continuity of a judge becomes impossible once public confidence in his character is lost.
“For a judge, integrity is binary because the people’s trust in the judiciary is the cornerstone of an Islamic welfare state,” the ruling states.
The court noted that judges are subject to a “code of chivalry” that requires essential qualities beyond legal knowledge and professional competence.
“Legal knowledge and skill are, of course, their fundamental attributes. But this intellectual endowment alone is not sufficient for the proper performance of their duties. They must also be endowed with the moral virtue of impartiality, which is, in fact, the very breath of their judicial life,” the ruling says.
The court emphasized that judges serve as the point where abstract principles of law become a lived reality for citizens.
“The judge is the point at which the abstraction of law becomes a lived reality. The parties do not come to discuss the laws, but to listen to a human conscience clothed in judicial office. If that conscience is doubted, the law itself becomes suspect,” the ruling states.
The court further observed that the judiciary derives its authority not from force but from legitimacy, which is based on two fundamental pillars: competence and integrity.
“Competence can be tested in judgment. Integrity is tested in reputation,” the court said.
The ruling warned that even a legally sound decision could lose credibility if handed down by a judge whose reputation has been tarnished.
“A judge can make sound law, and yet if his name carries a stain in the public’s mind, the ruling will be met with suspicion,” he said. The court held that the ethical standards expected of judges go beyond simply avoiding committing unlawful acts.
“Ethically, the judicial position requires more than the absence of wrongdoing. It demands the presence of blameless character. The standard for a judge is not ‘innocent’ but ‘irreproachable.'”
The ruling explained that, unlike elected officials, judges exercise power without political accountability and often without immediate review, making public confidence in their integrity indispensable.
“The only control is the trust of the people. Therefore, retaining a judge becomes impossible once it is discovered that his reputation is bad,” the court held. He further observed that judicial institutions require not only real integrity but also the appearance of integrity.
“The judicial institution requires not only integrity, but also the appearance of integrity,” the ruling adds.
Referring to Islamic principles governing public offices, the court noted that authority is considered a mandate (amāna) that must be exercised with justice and equity.
The court next addressed the question of punishment and examined whether mandatory retirement was an appropriate penalty for a judicial officer whose reputation had been deemed tarnished.
According to the ruling, the guiding principle for determining the penalty is proportionality, requiring that the penalty correspond to the seriousness of the offense and the damage caused.
The court held that the real harm in such cases is the loss of public confidence in the judiciary. “The judicial officer in the present case, by compromising his impartiality, not only lost the public’s trust but also strangled his judicial career,” the ruling states.
He noted that once public confidence in the integrity of a judicial official is fractured, the damage extends beyond the individual concerned and affects the rule of law itself.
“The moment public confidence in the integrity of the judicial officer was fractured, the fracture ran through the entire structure of the rule of law, undermining the integrity of the judicial institution itself. His continuation in office had become incompatible with the interests of the institution,” the court said.
The ruling drew a clear distinction between mandatory retirement and separation from service, describing the difference as substantive and not merely semantic.
“Mandatory retirement may be imposed, in certain circumstances, when the objective is to eliminate dead waste or when retention is no longer administratively viable,” he observed.
However, the court ruled that mandatory retirement cannot be used in cases involving disreputable judges because such an outcome would allow them to leave office with benefits despite the damage caused to public trust.
“In any case, it cannot be imposed on a judge with a bad reputation, since allowing him to retire with benefits would suggest that reputation is negotiable, which would go against the very objective of the sentence,” the ruling states.
The court concluded that dismissal from service is justified when a judge’s conduct affects both the personal integrity and the moral reputation of the institution, thereby undermining public confidence in the judiciary.
“Consequently, separation from service is justified when the conduct affects the integrity of the judge and the morality of the institution and damages public trust,” the court held.
Criticizing the approach taken by the court in the case, the Supreme Court observed that it had failed to appreciate the distinction between compulsory retirement and dismissal.
“It appears that the Court overlooked this distinction: that when a corrupt or disreputable judge is removed, the judicial institution begins to heal because a specific tumor has been removed,” the ruling concludes.
