- Mamona runs silently, never touches the Internet and is erased, which makes it difficult to detect
- A three -second delay followed by self -election helps Mamona evade detection rules
- Ransomware behavior combines with normal activity, delaying the response of the security equipment
Security researchers are tracking Mamona, a recently identified ransomware strain that stands out for its stripped design and local and local execution.
Wazuh experts say that this ransomware avoids the usual dependence of command and control servers, opting for an autonomous approach that slips tools beyond the tools that depend on network traffic analysis.
It runs locally in a Windows system as an independent binary file, and this out -of -line behavior exposes a blind spot on conventional defenses, forcing a rethinking of how even the best antivirus and detection systems should work when there is no network.
Self -election and evasion tactics complicate detection
After the execution, it starts a three -second delay using a modified ping command, cmd.exe /c ping 127.0.7 -n 3> nul & of /f /q, and then autoselitos.
This self -lift reduces forensic artifacts, which makes researchers difficult to track or analyze malware after it has been executed.
Instead of using the popular 127.0.0.1, use 127.0.0.7, which helps avoid detection rules.
This method evades simple detection patterns and avoids digital traces that traditional files based on files could be marked.
Drop a rescue note entitled Readme.haes.txt and rename the files affected with the extension .Haes, pointing out a successful encryption operation.
Wazuh warns that “Malware Plug-And-Play Nature reduces the barrier to cybercriminals, contributing to the broader commercialization of ransomware.”
This change suggests a need for greater scrutiny of what qualifies as the best ransomware protection, especially when such threats no longer need remote control infrastructure to cause damage.
The Wazuh approach to detect Mamona implies the integration of Sysmon for the capture of records and the use of personalized rules to mark specific behaviors, such as the creation of rescue notes and ping -based delays.
The 100901 rule is directed to the creation of the Readme.haes.txt file, while rule 100902 confirms the presence of ransomware when both the rescue note activity and the delay/self -ellet sequence appear together.
These rules help identify indicators that could otherwise escape the most general monitoring configurations.
To respond to Mamona before the damage is done, Wazuh uses Yara rules and a file integrity monitoring system (FIM) in real time.
When a suspicious file is added or modified, especially in the download folder of a user, the WAZUH active response module triggers a Yara scan.
This immediate remediation mimics what one could expect from the best DDOS protection strategies, acting quickly before a deeper commitment occurs.
As ransomware continues to evolve, it also owes the best antivirus solutions, and although no unique tool guarantees perfect protection, modular response solutions give defenders a flexible and evolving edge.
