In October 2025, Pakistan closed all major western crossings with Afghanistan. Pakistan claimed that the closures were necessary due to escalating tensions and TTP-related attacks originating from Afghan territory. The current regime does not indicate a return to normal movement in the near future.
The immediate costs of the closure have fallen on traders, transporters, workers, laborers and border communities who depend on cross-border movement for both economic and social reasons.
Cross-border trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan is critical to the border economy. It begins before the customs gate, in social connections, reputation, family ties, language, credit and pre-existing business relationships. Much of this trading is mediated by trading networks and brokers, whose credibility depends on trust. For people living in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the border is more than a political line between the two countries; It is a long-standing socioeconomic space.
From an anthropological point of view, areas near borders comprise communities with ties to both countries: the country in which they reside and the country across the line where they have ethnic, linguistic and kinship ties. The official line between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been shaped by centuries of connection; Therefore, trade in the region is not simply a matter of goods passing through official channels. Much of it is also done through credit, given the lack of formal banking and credit systems in the region.
Policies relating to the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan make extensive use of concepts such as regulation, security, closure and control. For border populations, however, the border is not just about security but also about a locally rooted economy of subsistence and mobility. It provides jobs for truck drivers, workers, warehouse staff, shippers, retailers and customs officials. The closure of the border not only affects trade figures but also alters the income, debt, mobility and daily planning of border merchants, transport workers and households.
Representatives of the business community have often cited a previous peak of around $2.7 billion in trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan, although this should be treated as an estimate by the business community as published figures vary widely. A 2018 report in ‘Profit’ claimed that bilateral trade had fallen from $2.7 billion to $1.2 billion in about 18 months, while other reports put the previous peak closer to $2.5 billion. Since then, trade has decreased significantly. According to the Afghan Ministry of Commerce, reported by Pajhwok, trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2024 amounted to $2,461 million and in 2025 to $1,766 million.
Pakistan Trade Development Authority’s December 2025 report shows that Pakistan’s exports to Afghanistan fell from $754 million in July-December 2024-25 to $336 million in July-December 2025-26. Imports from Afghanistan also decreased from $419 million to $239 million during the same period. This means Pakistan’s recorded goods trade with Afghanistan fell from about $1.173 billion to $575 million in the first half of 2025-26.
My fieldwork with traders and transporters shows that many traders involved in the Pakistan-Afghanistan trade had strong homes and networks in Kabul. These networks gave Khyber and Peshawar traders an advantage because they could supply goods on credit to Afghan traders due to trust between them. My fieldwork with transporters in Karachi reinforces the same point about the importance of these networks.
After the border closure, profit margins fell sharply, in some cases more than 50 percent. The livelihood chain associated with a single truck is much broader than that of the single driver, as thousands of households depend on the road transport economy indirectly through people such as drivers, assistants, loading dock staff, mechanics, tire dealers, service stations, petrol stations, warehouses, customs clearance agents, middlemen and small traders. The effect of a complete stoppage of truck traffic for a certain period of time is not limited to transport companies. This will have a flow-on effect throughout the industry’s employment structure.
Today, many traders in Peshawar and Karachi remember a time when travel to and from the border was easier and more familiar. They had homes, relatives, land and networks of contacts in Kabul, Jalalabad and Kandahar. For the people of this region, the border has always been a shared space of passage, trade, kinship and interdependence between the tribal areas and border districts of Balochistan and neighboring Afghanistan.
This is precisely what current politics fails to recognize. The government cannot hope to keep borders secure by creating uncertainty in legitimate trade. While frequent closures may be justified on security grounds, in practice they punish those who have invested time and money in legal commerce to make a living: drivers, workers, small merchants, brokers and families who live near the border. Furthermore, closing legitimate lines of communication creates an environment that is conducive to the development of informal channels and increases capital outflow.
Trade and security must be addressed separately. This does not mean weakening regulations; It means recognizing that legal commerce cannot survive repeated closures and uncertainty. Pakistan’s approach towards Afghanistan should be more focused on the economy, but it remains heavily focused on security. A viable border economy will require clear guidelines for open borders, better customs regulations, payment systems and consultations with chambers, transport unions, customs agents and traders in border areas.
Pakistan can manage the Pakistan-Afghanistan border more effectively by viewing it not only as a place of state control but also as a conduit for exchange, movement and community ties.
Border communities should not be treated simply as objects of security policy and left to bear the costs of border closure. They must be recognized as economic actors whose participation is essential for lasting border management and security. Policies should keep formal trade viable rather than forcing it out of regulated systems.
The author is a policy analyst and researcher. He is the author of ‘Pakistan’s Tribal Borderlands’ and can be contacted at: [email protected]
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of PakGazette.tv.
Originally published in The News
